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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL 
By way of cross-appeal, ESI has appealed the trial court's denial of its Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions. In support of its cross-appeal, ESI identified three (3) issues which 
are controlling: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to describe the conduct 
constituting the basis for its denial of ESFs Motion or, alternatively, whether the 
trial court's findings are unsupported by the evidence; 
2. Whether the trial court's legal conclusion that no Rule 11(b) 
violation had been committed is an error of law; and 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding 
sanctions against MYI and its counsel. 
See Br. of Appellees and Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "ESI Opening Br.") at pp. 24, 27, 
44. Because it was unclear whether the trial court's single "finding" - "the Court finds 
insufficient evidence of violation of Rule 11" - was a finding of law or a finding of fact 
or conclusion of law, ESI addressed both scenarios. Id, §§ LB; II. ESI first argued the 
trial court's failure to make any factual findings to support its legal conclusion denying 
the Motion was clearly erroneous based upon the Court's failure to address each alleged 
misrepresentation or action and specify why each did not violate the provisions of Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id § I, pp. 25-27. Second, ESI argued the trial 
court's legal conclusion was an error of law and marshaled the relevant evidence to 
demonstrate why the findings were clearly erroneous. Id, § II, pp. 27- 43. 
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In response, MYI argues the trial court's finding was sufficient and, without 
specifically responding to the other issues identified by ESI, claimed three (3) separate 
"issues" had been raised by ESFs cross-appeal. See Br. of Appellant and Cross-Appellee 
(hereinafter "MYI Reply Br.") at p. 19. Specifically, MYI contends the relevant "issues" 
include the following: 
1. Whether MYI and its counsel could have violated Rule 11(b) by 
continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 2004 when there was no 
pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claim and, even if there had been, when Utah 
R. Civ. P. 25(c) ("Rule 25(c)") legally authorized the continued prosecution, as 
ruled by the district court. Id at p. 19 {citing R. 3993-4013, 4014-4100); see also 
id., §11, pp. 30-35. 
2. Whether ESI misused Rule 11 to seek a final disposition of the 
Subject Claims in its favor based upon its claim that there had been a pendente lite 
transfer of the Subject Claims when ESFs Rule 11 motion turned on the merits of 
that claim and ESI sought the dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice 
as a sanction even though ESI did not claim the Amended Complaint had been 
filed in violation of Rule 11. Id at p. 19 {citing R. 3993-4013, 4014-4100); see 
also id, § III, pp. 35-39. 
3. Whether, even incorrectly assuming MYI and its counsel could have 
violated Rule 11(b) by continuing to prosecute the Subject Claims after April 
2004, did they violate Rule 11(b) by doing so and asserting MYI's continued right 
to prosecute those claims when: (1) ESI first asserted its claim that there had been 
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a pendent lite transfer of the Subject Claims in January 2007; (2) Mr. Seely and 
Developers, the alleged transferees, each understood there had not been & pendente 
lite transfer of the Subject Claims; and (3) there is no evidence that conclusively 
established there had been di pendent lite transfer of those claims? Id. at p. 19 
(citing R. 3993-4013, 4014-4100); see also id at § IV., pp. 39-50. 
ESI recognizes that Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits an 
appellee to submit a statement of the issues if it is dissatisfied with the statement of the 
appellant; however, the "issues" as identified by MYI appear to be its effort to marshal 
evidence to support the trial court's ruling denying the Rule 11 Motion. MYI's issues 
will, therefore, be individually addressed where appropriate in Sections II and III of this 
Reply Brief. See n. 1, infra. 
L MYI FAILED TO CREDIBLY REBUT ESFS CLAIM THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSORY FINDING IS INSUFFICIENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND REMAND IS APPROPRIATE OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In Section I of its Argument in Support of Cross Appeal, ESI argued the district 
court's failure to meet the standard imposed in Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992) justified remand so an order could be entered more fully explaining its rationale in 
denying ESFs Rule 11 Motion. Alternatively, ESI argued that even if the appellate court 
found the trial court's explanation supporting its denial sufficiently met the Sutliff 
standard, the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the 
record. See ESI Opening Br. at § I, pp. 24-27. 
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In response, MYI does not dispute that the trial court's single "finding" - "the 
Court finds insufficient evidence of Rule 11" - is a conclusion of law. Rather, MYI 
argues the district court's findings were sufficient, claiming the district court was not 
"required" to make any findings beyond its conclusory finding of "insufficient evidence 
of violation of Rule 11(b)." See MYI Reply Br., § I, pp. 28-30. Specifically, MYI argues 
that this honorable court has recently "reviewed" similar "conclusory findings" in 
Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App. 2, \ 20, 224 P.3d 741 and found such 
findings "sufficient." In addition, MYI argues that ESI did not seek Rule 11 sanctions 
based upon any claim that any particular filing was false in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) or 
(4). See MYI Reply Br. at p. 29. MYI asserts that ESI did not seek retraction of 
particular allegations, statements or denials with its Rule 11 Motion, but, instead, sought 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and an award of all of its attorney 
fees. Id. MYI's arguments are without legal merit. 
First, contrary to MYI's claim, the Gillmor Court did not "review" the sufficiency 
of the district court's findings. There is no argument in that case, by either party or by 
the appellate court, that the findings made by the district court in Gillmor were 
insufficient to support the district court's order. In fact, it is obvious from the appellate 
court decision that the district court analysis was fairly detailed. See, e.g., id. at f 17 
(describing the district court's finding, the district court's analysis with respect to the 
subject matter of the suit on appeal with early suits, and its conclusion that a Rule 
11(b)(2) violation had occurred given the plaintiffs failure to identify an applicable 
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exception to the bar imposed by res judicata); see also f 20 (describing the district 
court's finding of lack of evidence and its finding of plaintiffs purpose in filing the 
litigation). Moreover, the trial court's decision reflects the district court's analysis 
supporting its ruling was quite extensive and detailed. A copy of the trial court's decision 
is attached as Tab 1 of the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
In Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, 973 P.2d 422, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized that where application of the iSW/z^standard is impossible because of the lack 
of meaningful explanation supporting the district court's order denying sanctions, remand 
is appropriate. MYI's brief only highlights the fact that remand is appropriate in this 
situation. For example, MYI speculates that "ESI's Rule 11 Motion . . . was properly 
denied as a matter of law because it was made for the purpose of obtaining a final 
disposition of the Subject Claims in ESI's favor, rather than seeking a remedy for any 
alleged harm or prejudice." See MYI Reply Br. at p. 27. However, the trial court never 
made this finding. In fact, neither party knows why the Rule 11 Motion was denied 
because the district court did not make any specific findings related to its denial. While 
MYI argued below that this would be a proper basis for denial of the Rule 11 Motion, (R. 
3996, 4009-4011), the district court did not refer to MYI's argument - or any other 
defense - when it concluded there was "insufficient evidence of violation of Rule 11(b)." 
Moreover, ESI's alleged failure to seek Rule 11 sanctions based on a particular 
filing {see MYI Reply Br. at p. 29) is not only false but it does not support MYI's claim 
that the district court made sufficient findings. As is set forth in detail on this appeal, 
below ESI identified both facts and arguments made by MYI which lacked evidentiary 
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support and/or were unwarranted by the evidence - all in violation of Rule 11. In 
addition, ESI requested that MYI correct (and gave MYI the opportunity to correct) 
MYI's pleadings before ESI filed its Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. See ESI Opening Br. 
at p. 41 (citing Statement of Relevant Facts (hereinafter "SRF") at \ 35). The choice of 
sanction does not diminish the argument. As set forth in more detail in § II.C, infra, the 
requested sanction was appropriate and warranted in the instant case. MYI pursued and 
continues to pursue claims that it does not own. Dismissal of these claims is not outside 
the realm of appropriateness under the circumstances. The trial court has great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of a particular case. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. 
Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 195 (Utah 1997); see also Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 
P.2d 1036, 1040, n.6 (Utah 1994). 
MYI has failed to credibly rebut ESPs first argument on appeal - that the trial 
court erred in failing to describe the conduct constituting the basis for its denial of ESPs 
Motion and that remand is appropriate. MYI's argument that the district court was not 
"required" to make any findings, see MYI Reply at p. 29, is not supported by Gillmor 
and, in fact, is completely contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Morse 
wherein it stated, "When denying a rule 11 motion for sanctions, a trial court must 
likewise describe the conduct constituting a basis for the denial." Morse, supra at f 13 
(emphasis added). 
Given the foregoing, ESI respectfully requests that this Court determine the 
district court's "findings" to be insufficient as a matter of law and remand so the trial 
court may enter an order more fully explaining its rationale in denying sanctions. 
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II. TO THE EXTENT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING BELOW WAS 
DEEMED TO BE ONE OF FACT, ESI MARSHALED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
LEGAL CONCLUSION OF NO RULE 11(b) VIOLATION IS AN ERROR 
OF LAW. 
When challenging a court's findings as erroneous, it is the appellant's burden to 
marshal all relevant evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly erroneous. Kealamakia v. Kealamakia, \ 10, 2009 UT App 148. 
Below, and on appeal, ESI argued MYI violated subsection (b)(2) of Rule 11 by asserting 
claims, defenses, and/or other legal contentions that were not warranted by existing law 
and violated subsection (b)(3) of Rule 11 by making allegations and other factual 
contentions that had no evidentiary support. Specifically, ESI alleged these violations 
occurred when MYI (1) concealed and/or confused the issue regarding ownership of the 
Subject Claim and (2) represented itself to be the real party in interest without a basis in 
law or fact. (R. 3301.) In response, MYI argues the following: 
• MYI Issue II: ESI's Rule 11 Motion failed as a matter of law 
because MYI never "lost" the right to prosecute the subject claims. See MYI 
Reply at § II, pp. 30-34. 
• MYI Issue III: ESFs Rule 11 Motion also failed as a matter of law 
because it was not filed to remedy any alleged harm or prejudice to ESI, but was 
filed for the improper purpose of obtaining a final disposition of the subject 
claims. See MYI Reply at § III, pp. 35-39. 
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• MYI Issue IV: Even incorrectly assuming there had been a pendente 
lite transfer of the subject claims and ownership of the subject claims mattered, 
ESI's Rule 11 Motions still would fail as a matter of law because there was a legal 
and factual justification for MYI to contest ESFs claim that there had been a 
pendent light transfer. See MYI Reply at f IV, pp. 39-50. 
As noted supra, these "issues," as identified by MYI, appear to be MYI's effort to 
marshal evidence to support the trial court's ruling denying the Rule 11 Motion. MYI's 
issues will, therefore, be individually addressed herein.1 
As a preliminary matter, however, in its Reply MYI claims that ESI, below, 
merely contended that particular arguments, statements, and denials were a "continuing" 
Rule 11 violation, as opposed to separate violations. See e.g., MYI Reply at p. 26. MYI 
argues that ESI cannot challenge the denial of its Motion on this basis because the issue 
was not raised below. See MYI Reply at pp. 47-48. MYI's argument is completely 
without merit. In the introduction to its Motion below ESI specifically stated: 
Since March 25, 2004, Merrick Young Incorporated (hereinafter "MYI") 
and its' counsel of record have repeatedly violated the provision of Rule 
The argument identified herein as "MYI Issue II" includes arguments related to 
transfer of ownership of the subject claims and Rule 25(c). The ownership issue will be 
addressed herein at section II.B.3. The Rule 25(c) issue will be addressed herein at 
section II.B.2. 
The argument identified herein as uMYI Issue III" purports to assert a legal basis 
upon which ESFs Rule 11 Motion could be properly denied but, as will be seen infra, is 
not a basis for denial of a Rule 11 Motion. This argument will be addressed herein at 
section II.C. 
The argument identified here as MYI Issue IV" deals specifically with the facts 
relied upon by ESI in support of its Motion and the present appeal. This issue will, 
therefore, be addressed as appropriate at §§ II.A. and ILB, infra. 
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11 by continuing in the prosecution of the above-entitled matter without a 
legal basis to do so. 
(R. 3301 (bold emphasis added)). ESI went on to identify "categories" of misconduct 
which it believed summarizes these repeated violations. Specifically, ESI first argued 
MYI concealed/confused the "issue regarding ownership of the claim(s) at issue" (R. 
3301) by flatly misrepresenting the identity of the purported owner, obfuscating 
ownership thereof, and taking inconsistent positions regarding ownership. See e.g., R. 
3308, 3311-3318 (identifying Mr. Farley's April 2004 Representation and MYFs use 
thereof to defeat ESFs efforts to depose and/or join Mr. Seely, and identifying the 
pleadings which evidence the inconsistent positions taken by MYI with respect to 
ownership of the claims). Next, ESI argued MYI represented itself to be the real party in 
interest without a basis in law or fact by improperly representing it was authorized by 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1302(6) to wind up its affairs and sue to protect its assets and by 
arguing it was authorized under Rule 25(c) to prosecute the claim as the assignor of the 
Subject Claims. (R. 3301; R. 3311-14.) Clearly therefore, ESI did not argue, for the first 
time on appeal, that the independent actions of MYI and its counsel each represent 
violations of Rule 11. MYFs argument in this regard should be summarily rejected. 
2
 MYI also asserts that in the trial court below, ESI failed to challenge MYFs assertion 
that "ESI was claiming MYFs entire post-April 2004 prosecution of the Subject Claims 
was the alleged Rule 11 violation." See MYI Reply at p. 28, n.5. While ESI did not file 
a reply memorandum, its memorandum in support of its Motion clearly, repeatedly, and 
specifically stated its Motion was based on "repeated violations." MYFs attempted re-
characterization of ESFs Motion does not change the basis upon which ESFs Motion was 
originally and clearly filed. 
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A. MYI and/or its Counsel Violated Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) of Rule 
11 by Concealing and Confusing the Issue Regarding Ownership of the 
Subject Claims. 
Below and on appeal, ESI contended MYI, through its counsel of record, violated 
Rule 11(b)(1) and (b)(3) by deliberately and intentionally concealing and confusing the 
issue regarding ownership of the Subject Claims by flatly misrepresenting the identity of 
the purported owner and by obfuscating ownership thereof. For the sake of clarity, each 
asserted violation will be individually addressed. 
1. Mr. Farley's April 2004 Representation and MYFs Use Thereof. 
Below and on appeal, ESI argued that Mr. Farley's April 12, 2004 letter 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Farley Letter") and MYI's use thereof 
concealed and confused the issue regarding ownership of the subject claims because Mr. 
Farley's representation regarding ownership was false and, in addition, was filed in 
support of various pleadings to oppose ESI's efforts to take Mr. Seely's Deposition, 
object to MYI's status as real party in interest, and/or substitute or join Mr. Seely as a 
party. See ESI Opening Br. at pp. 28-29. For the first time in this appeal,3 MYI claims 
the Farley Letter "does not show that MYI transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely or 
MYI's counsel's actual or constructive knowledge of such an alleged transfer." See MYI 
Reply at pp. 43-44. MYI further argues the Farley Letter was simply attached to the 
pleadings to demonstrate that ESI was "on notice of the alleged ownership issue." See id. 
3
 Below, MYI did not dispute the existence of the letter or its use but argued that 
because it was not made in the form of a pleading, it was not a filing subject to Rule 11. 
(R. 4009.) As noted in ESI's Opening Brief however, Rule 11(b) specifies a violation 
may occur in "any other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating)." U.R.C.P. 11(b). 
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at pp. 48-49, n. 14. MYI's present (and new) arguments do not excuse it from running 
afoul of Rule 11. 
As a preliminary matter, MYI's claim that the Farley Letter does not "show" a 
transfer of the Subject Claims and/or that its attorneys lacked actual or constructive 
knowledge of a transfer is completely irrelevant to whether a Rule 11 violation occurred. 
Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on attorneys and litigants to make a reasonable 
investigation (under the circumstances) of the facts and the law before signing and 
submitting any pleading, motion, or other paper. Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, 1f 28, 15 
P.3d 1021. While Rule 11 does not impose a duty to perform perfect or exhaustive 
research, the research must have been objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. 
Id. 
In this case, MYI's substitute counsel (Dennis Farley) received a letter from 
MYI's former counsel (Robert Jensen) notifying him that "MYI is controlled and 
essentially owned" by the bond company. See ESI Opening Br., SRF at f 10. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate whether Mr. Farley conducted any reasonable inquiry 
regarding the truth of this statement; however, approximately two (2) weeks later on 
April 12, 2004, Mr. Farley notified counsel for ESI that MYI was "controlled and 
essentially owned by its Bond Company." Id. at ^ 13. Mr. Farley further stated, "The 
Bond Company owns the assets of Merrick Young, Incorporated, including all accounts 
receivable, etc., and the assets of Merrick Young individually and his wife individually." 
Id. Given the fact that the Subject Claims were based upon MYI's accounts receivable, 
Rule 11 imposed upon Mr. Farley the responsibility of investigating whether his client 
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owned the Subject Claims and could continue to prosecute the pending litigation. 
Thereafter, MYI referenced the Farley Letter in three (3) separate pleadings, 
attaching the letter to two (2) of those pleadings. (R. 3701 (referencing attachment "F" 
(R. 3708-3752); R. 3840 at ^ 3 (referencing attachment "F" (R. 3708-3752); R. 3849 
(referencing attachment "F" at R. 3708-3752 and reattaching the Farley Letter as 
attachment "F" (R. 3863-3907)). For the first time in this Appeal, MYI argues the Farley 
Letter was attached to the pleadings simply to "demonstrate" ESI's receipt of the Farley 
Letter over two years earlier, "such that ESI was on notice of the alleged ownership 
issue." See MYI Reply Br. at pp. 48-49, n. 14. MYI further claims no Rule 11 violation 
occurred because the Farley Letter did not contain "a false statement." See id. MYI's 
argument not only requires a revision of the pleadings to which the Farley Letter was 
attached, but its argument is also without merit. 
A Rule 11 violation occurs if factual or legal contentions are made which lack 
support, see U.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) - (b)(4), or if a representation is made for an improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. See id; see also Morse v. Packer, supra, 2000 UT 86, at ffij 28-29 ("[W]here 
[counsel] had access to, and must have seen, information flatly contradicting an 
allegation in his complaint, a reasonable inquiry would have necessitated more adequate 
research of the facts. [Counsel's] failure to adequately research the facts resulted in his 
making a statement in his pleading that clearly lacked evidentiary support. In so doing, 
[counsel] violated Rule 11.") Moreover, a litigant's obligations with respect to the 
contents of its pleadings are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or 
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submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court the positions contained in 
those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit. See Morse 
v. Packer, supra, at f 31 (quoting the advisory committee for the federal rule). 
In this case, it is undisputed the Farley Letter instructed counsel for ESI that the 
"Bond Company" owned MYI's assets. See SFR at ^ 13. At the time this statement was 
made, Mr. Farley either failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the basis for the claims 
which his "new client" was attempting to prosecute or Mr. Farley knew about the 
Settlement Agreement and intentionally misrepresented the ownership of the Subject 
Claims.4 Thereafter, MYI's counsel indisputably became aware of the Settlement 
Agreement, see R. 3849 (wherein MYI acknowledges possession of the Settlement 
Agreement), but nevertheless used the Farley Letter (knowing the statements therein to 
be false) to claim ESI was aware of the transfer/sale of the assets, to stop ESI from taking 
Mr. Seely's deposition (R. 3700-3706), and to oppose ESFs efforts to join Mr. Seely as a 
Plaintiff in the litigation. (R. 3839-3856; R. 3848-3857.) While MYI claims it only used 
the Farley Letter to "demonstrate" ESFs knowledge of the "alleged ownership issue," see 
MYI Reply at pp. 48-49, n. 14, this is not true and it does not rebut ESFs claims that 
MYI violated Rule 11 by confusing/concealing the ownership issue. In fact, referencing 
the Farley Letter, MYI argued in its various pleadings that ESI knew of Seely's 
4
 It is irrelevant whether Mr. Farley understood the Settlement Agreement transferred 
the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely or whether he believed MYI had retained the Subject 
Claims. The Farley Letter was nonetheless false when written, false when relied upon by 
MYI in its pleadings - and the false content was never corrected by MYI's counsel. The 
Farley Letter explicitly states Developers ("the Bond Company") owns and essentially 
controls MYI. The Farley Letter further unequivocally stated the Bond Company owned 
the assets of MYI, including the accounts receivable. 
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"involvement with," "interest in," and/or "ownership o f MYI's assets. (R. 3701, 3705, 
3845,3850, 15235, 3855-3856.) 
The representations concerning ownership of MYI assets, including MYFs 
accounts receivable, set forth in the Farley Letter were not true when written and despite 
MYI's subsequent knowledge of the falsity, MYI again used the false Farley Letter in an 
attempt to ascribe "knowledge of the transfer" to ESI and stop ESI's efforts to discover or 
uncover the real party in interest and join that party in the instant litigation.6 As such, the 
Farley Letter was presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay and/or needless increase in the cost of litigation - all in violation of 
subsection (b)(1) and (b)(3) of Rule l l . 7 
2. MYI's Inconsistent Positions Regarding Ownership. 
Below and on appeal, ESI argued that MYI and/or its counsel of record further 
violated Rule 11 in a series of pleadings filed in early 2007 wherein it began taking 
5
 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Substitution is first identified in 
the Appellate Record as R. 1517 - 1702. This Memorandum was subsequently re-filed as 
an Attachment to ESI's Motion for Sanctions. As an Attachment the Memorandum was 
renumbered R. 3848 - 3975. The seventh page of the of the Memorandum (between R. 
3853 and R. 3854) was not numbered; therefore, the appellate number designated on the 
original filing has been used. 
6
 Now, ironically, MYI claims there was no transfer at all but ESI should have had 
"knowledge of the ownership issue." 
7
 MYI's argument that ESI's Rule 11 Motion fails as a matter of law because the 
Subject Claims were never "lost" does not preclude a finding of a Rule 11 violation with 
respect to the Farley Letter. MYI's counsel informed ESI's counsel that Developers 
owned the assets of MYI, including all accounts receivable, etc. MYI then used the 
Farley Letter in support of pleadings to argue that ESI "knew" that the claims had been 
transferred. If the Subject Claims were never "lost," the Farley Letter did not need to be 
written. Alternatively, the Farley Letter could have been written in a fashion to establish 
that an issue concerning ownership of the Subject Claims did, in fact, exist. 
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inconsistent positions regarding ownership of the Subject Claims. See ESI Opening Br. 
at pp. 29-30. Specifically, ESI argued MYI's claim of continued ownership was directly 
contrary to the Farley Letter and also inconsistent with the testimony of MYI's principals. 
Id. In response, and for the first time in this appeal, MYI simply states that ESI has given 
the testimony of MYI's principals "too much significance." See MYI's Opp. at p. 45. 
Ironically, this testimony (which confirmed that MYI had no assets and had transferred 
all its accounts receivable to Mr. Seely) is the only actual evidence in the record of the 
intent and knowledge of the parties regarding ownership of assets. MYI's present 
attempt to explain or justify the testimony of MYI's principal(s) is only argument - not 
evidence - and should not be considered by this Court. Below, MYI ignored ESI's 
argument when it presented this testimony in support of its Motion. (R. 3309-3310.) 
The Court should not now consider MYI's arguments to change the impact of the only 
evidence in the record. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, f 39, 86 P.3d 699. MYI's 
counsel obviously could have clarified its client's testimony at the depositions or by 
affidavit in one of the many motions which has been filed on this issue. MYI's counsel 
did not do so and should not be permitted to do so now - at a time when ESI cannot 
cross-examine MYI's principals regarding their counsel's "explanation" of their prior 
testimony. MYI's inconsistent positions, which are further discussed at § II.A.4 and § 
ILB.1-2, lack evidentiary support and were clearly presented for an improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and/or an increase in the cost of litigation in 
violation of Rule 11(b)(3) and (b)(1). 
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3. MYFs Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim, 
Below and on appeal, ESI argued MYI and/or its counsel of record violated Rule 
11 in responding to the Second Amended Counterclaim. See ESI Opening Br. at pp. 30-
31. In response, MYI argues that because it unambiguously denied ESFs allegations that 
MYI had transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, its Reply to the Second Amended 
Counterclaim did not establish a Rule 11 violation. See MYI Reply at p. 46. MYI 
"claims" its denial was supported by the evidence - "specifically, Mr. Seely's and MYFs 
understandings and the March 2004 Settlement Agreement itself." Id. MYI is 
conveniently cherry picking "evidence" in this case. MYI ignores the statements of Mr. 
Farley in the Farley Letter, MYFs admitted production of draft 
release/assignment/purchase documents in discovery, MYTs discussion of the draft 
documents in its pleadings, MYTs admission that it entered into the Settlement 
Agreement and its representations in pleadings regarding the effect of that document, and 
the testimonial evidence of Alan and Merrick Young. 
Moreover, MYFs Reply to the Second Amended Complaint likewise ran afoul of Rule 11 
to the extent MYI continued to assert it had a right to continue to prosecute the Subject Claims. 
On May 15, 2007, the Trial Court granted ESFs Motion for Substitution and joined Mr. Seely as 
a plaintiff. (R. 2906). Pursuant to Rule 25(c), an "original plaintiff may only continue to 
prosecute an action until the court substitutes or joins the person to whom the interest was 
transferred. See U.R.C .P. 25(c): ("In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be 
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to 
whom the interest is transferred be substituted in the action or joined with the original party." 
16 
(Bold emphasis added.) Accordingly, even if Mr. Seely had authorized MYI to continue the 
prosecution of the instant action (a fact MYI has not established), that right was divested on May 
15,2007 when the trial court joined Mr. Seely as a plaintiff. 
4. MYFs Misrepresentations and Inconsistent Positions Were Not 
Warranted by Evidence or Likely to Have Evidentiary Support After 
Reasonable Opportunity for Further Investigation or Discovery. 
Below and on appeal, ESI pointed out that MYI did not dispute making any of the 
identified representations/misrepresentations. Rather, MYI relied solely on the argument 
that because the ownership of the Subject Claims had not been finally adjudicated, none 
of the statements it made in any of its pleadings were in violation of Rule 11. See ESI 
Opening Br. at p. 31. In its Reply Brief, MYI addresses, for the first time, some of the 
representations/misrepresentations identified by ESI. 
MYI's repeated use of the Farley Letter to show ESFs purported "knowledge" of 
the ownership of the Subject Claims has been discussed at § II.A. 1., supra, and is 
incorporated herein by reference. As noted by ESI in its Opening Brief, MYI has not and 
cannot explain the purpose of the use of the disclosure in the Farley Letter if, in fact, 
MYI believed ownership of the Subject Claims to be an unresolved legal issue. If MYI 
relies upon the Farley Letter to argue ESI knew or should have known since 2004 of the 
ownership of the Subject Claims, its later arguments that ownership of the Subject Claims 
is unresolved are without legal or factual merit. On the other hand, if there is any merit to 
MYI's assertion that the ownership of the Subject Claims is unresolved, there was no 
merit to MYI's prior argument that ESI should be precluded from deposing Mr. Seely or 
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amending the pleadings because of its "knowledge" of the ownership of the Subject 
Claims. 
MYI does not dispute ESFs contention that MYI misrepresented to the Court, on 
numerous occasions, that MYI produced a "fully executed" Settlement Agreement. See 
ESI Opening Br. at p. 31, n. 16. As previously noted, MYI never produced a copy of the 
fully executed Settlement Agreement to ESI. Id. MYI does assert, however, that this is a 
discovery/disclosure issue which does not fall within the purview of Rule 11. See MYI 
Reply at p. 49. ESI does not dispute that Rule 11 does not govern discovery or disclosure 
issues. See U.R.C.P. 11(d). Moreover, ESI does not identify the actual 
disclosure/discovery response as a Rule 11 violation. Rather, ESI claims that MYI 
violated Rule 11 when it improperly represented to the Court, on multiple occasions, that 
it had produced a "fully executed" Settlement Agreement and relied upon the alleged 
disclosure to claim it did not withhold information from ESI related to the transfer of the 
Subject Claims. See ESI Opening Br. at pp. 31-32, n. 16. 
With respect to the inconsistent representations made by MYI between January 
and March 2007, see ESI Opening Br. at p. 32, MYI claims ESI is ignoring portions of 
the pleadings and MYI was "on record as asserting that only certain of MYI5s assets had 
been transferred to Mr. Seely, which did not include the Subject Claims." MYI Reply Br. 
at pp. 44-46. MYTs response only bolsters ESFs position that MYI's misrepresentations 
and inconsistent positions were not warranted by evidence or likely to have evidentiary 
support after reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery. ESI did not 
ignore portions of the pleadings that were filed by MYI during this time frame. ESFs 
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argument is that the pleadings were obscure regarding ownership of the claims. On the 
one hand, MYI relied upon the contents of the Farley Letter to represent that ownership 
of MYI's assets, including all accounts receivable, was held by Developers. (R. 3701 at f 
1.) MYI claimed Mr. Seely's deposition was "not necessary" because Utah's corporate 
winding up statute permitted MYI to sue to collect amounts due and owing. (R. 3702.) 
MYI claimed it had "disclosed Mr. Seely's interest in [MYI's] assets" (bold emphasis 
added) for over a year and used such "disclosure" (including the false claim of disclosure 
of the folly executed Settlement Agreement (R. 3705)) as a basis to quash the deposition 
notice. In a subsequent pleading, MYI continued to rely upon the Farley Letter and the 
alleged production of the executed Settlement Agreement stating it had produced 
information "concerning Developers' acquisition of MYI assets." (R. 3840 at ffl[ 3-4; 
bold emphasis added) Therein, MYI admits the Settlement Agreement assigned "all 
interest, rights, and title to MYI's assets" (R. 3841 at f 5; bold emphasis added); 
however, citing the Settlement Agreement, MYI also vaguely asserted the omission of 
certain assets in the transfer between Developers and Seely. (R. 3841 at f 6.) This 
argument was not developed in MYI's pleading and was not supported by the language of 
the Settlement Agreement.8 In a March 2007 memorandum, filed by MYI in Opposition 
8
 In its Reply Brief, MYI asserts this pleading "stated that the Subject Claims were not 
included in the assets that had been transferred to Mr. Seely." MYI Reply Br. at pp. 44-
45. At that time, MYI did not rely upon the "limited definition" of "Indemnitor's 
Assets." Instead, MYI appeared to be claiming that the litigation was excepted from 
transfer pursuant to paragraphs 2(d) and 2(g) (R. 3841 at f 6) - which it was not. See R. 
1676-1677 at ff 2(d), 2(g). MYI also appeared to assert that the accounts receivable may 
not have been assigned pursuant to Article 111(1) of the Settlement Agreement. See R. 
3841 at f 6. This reference was likewise completely without merit {see R. 1678 at § III, \ 
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to ESFs Motion for Substitution, MYI summarized ESFs argument by stating ESI 
"alleged that [MYI] failed to provide defendants with notice of Mr. Seely's purchase of 
MYTs assets." (R. 3849.) In response to that argument, MYI specifically detailed the 
alleged efforts it took in notifying ESI of the loss and transfer of assets. Id. MYI 
identified both the Farley Letter and the Settlement Agreement stating, "The Settlement 
Agreement transferred MYI assets from MYI to Developers and subsequently from 
Developers to Seely." (R. 3849-3850.) Thereafter, MYI objected to substituting Mr. 
Seely as Plaintiff - not because he didn't own the claims9 - but because there was "no 
express provision in the Settlement Agreement requiring or authorizing Seely to 
substitute himself as plaintiff in the present litigation or to prosecute, compromise, 
dismiss, or otherwise dispose of the current lawsuit." (R. 3851 at Tf 7.) MYI attempts to 
justify this ambiguity by stating it "already was on record as asserting that only certain of 
MYTs assets had been transferred to Mr. Seely, which did not include the Subject 
Claims." See MYI Reply at p. 45. MYI also asserts that its argument was stated in the 
alternative - positing that it remained the valid plaintiff regardless of the transfer of the 
Subject Claims pursuant to Rule 25(c). The "legal merits" of MYI's Rule 25(c) argument 
will be addressed, infra, at § II.B.2. MYTs assertion, however, that it could make 
1), was not developed by MYI in its pleading, and has not been pursued by MYI in its 
present assertion of ownership of the Subject Claims. 
See R. 3850 ("Clyde Seely ('Seely') is the present owner of MYI assets pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement executed by MYI on March 25, 2004"); see also R. 3855 ("[Seely] 
did not even purchase MYTs assets from MYI, he purchased MYTs assets from 
Developers"); see also R. 3856 ("[ESI] knew that MYTs assets had been attached by 
Developers no later than April 2004, and that they had been acquired by Seely no later 
than November 2005. . .") . 
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inconsistent factual representations and conceal or otherwise confuse the issue of 
ownership of the Subject Claims without running afoul of Rule 11 is completely without 
merit and should be rejected by this Court.10 
B. MYI and/or its Counsel Violated Rule 11 by Representing MYI to be 
the Real Party in Interest Without Basis in Law or Fact. 
Below and on appeal, ESI contended MYI violated Rule 11 by representing itself 
to be the real party in interest without basis in law or fact. See ESI Opening Br. at pp. 
33-37. ESI further argued there was not a valid purpose for MYFs continued role as 
Plaintiff after April 2004. Id. at pp. 37-43. MYTs reply to this issue is not easy to follow 
as, in its Reply Brief, MYI attempts to "change" the issues raised on appeal by ESI. ESI 
will, therefore, identify the issues raised by ESI and the apparent responses asserted by 
MYI. Thereafter, ESI will address any lingering arguments that remain by virtue of 
MYTs identification of "new issues." 
1. MYI and/or its Counsel Violated Rule ll(b)(lM3) by 
Representing it Was Authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1302(6) to Wind Up Affairs and Sue to Protect its Assets 
Without Basis in Law or Fact 
Below and on appeal, ESI first argued MYI and/or its counsel violated Rule 11 by 
In its Reply Brief, MYI argues it was "ESI who was claiming there had been a 
pendente lite transfer of the Subject Claims" and therefore ESI, and not MYI, had the 
burden of proving this claim. See MYI Reply at pp. 46-47. MYTs argument with respect 
to burden is a red herring. ESI alleged MYI violated Rule 11 by, inter alia, making 
contentions unsupported by fact and law. ESI met its burden in identifying MYTs false 
and inconsistent statements and improper legal arguments, which will be discussed in 
more detail at § II.B.1-2. MYTs burden in responding to the Rule 11 violation was to 
establish that its factual contentions had evidentiary support and its legal contentions 
were warranted by law. MYI did not meet its burden in this regard. 
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improperly claiming MYI was authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1302(6) to wind up 
affairs and sue to protect its assets when MYI filed a protective order and a motion to 
quash subpoena in response to ESI's efforts to take the deposition of Clyde G. Seely. See 
ESI Opening Br. at pp. 34-35. As noted in ESI's Opening Brief, MYI did not address 
ESI's contentions in this regard at all in the motion papers below. Id. at p. 33. On 
appeal, however, MYI claims this argument did not violate Rule 11 because the 
"contention was warranted by existing law" and the argument did not become moot until 
MYI was reinstated. See MYI Reply at p. 44. 
MYI's newly asserted defense is completely without merit. In January 2007, MYI 
was not a dissolved company. MYI's suggestion to this Court to the contrary is 
absolutely false. While MYI was administratively dissolved on March 30, 2003, Alan 
Young reinstated the corporation on September 29, 2004. See ESI Opening Br., SRF | f 
6, 16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422, because the reinstatement occurred 
within two (2) years of the dissolution, the administrative dissolution is revoked and the 
company can resume as if no dissolution ever occurred. Contrary to MYI's original 
claims below (R. 4005-4009) and on this appeal, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1302(6) is 
irrelevant to the litigation and had no basis in law or fact when the argument was made. 
2. MYI and/or its Counsel of Record Violated Rule ll(b)(l)-(3) in 
Arguing it was Authorized by Rule 25(c) to continue to Prosecute as 
the Assignor of the Subject Claims 
Below and on appeal, ESI next argued Rule 11 was violated by MYI and/or its 
counsel of record when MYI claimed Rule 25(c) authorized it to continue to prosecute 
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the Subject Claims as assignor of the Subject Claims. ESI argued there is nothing in the 
record to support MYI's assertion that it "assigned" the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. See 
ESI Opening Br. at p. 36. In addition, ESI asserted that Rule 25(c) does not provide the 
means for a party to continue to pursue, without authorization, a claim which it lost after 
inception of the litigation. Id. In its Reply Brief, MYI argues it never "lost" the right to 
prosecute the Subject Claims in the first instance. See MYI Reply at p. 30. Next, MYI 
asserts the district court ruled that MYI's continued role as the plaintiff after April 2004 
was proper under Rule 25(c). See MYI Reply at pp. 24-25 at % 3; see also id. at p. 32. 
Finally, MYI asserts that even if the Subject Claims were lost and sold, ESI failed to offer 
any "legal authority" for its proposition that Mr. Seely (or Developers) would have to 
authorize MYI's continued prosecution. See MYI Reply at pp. 30-34. MYI's arguments 
are without merit and do not justify its conduct after 2004. 
a. MYI Has Waived and/or Should be Estopped from Asserting 
it Never "Lost" the Right to Prosecute the Subject Claims. 
As noted supra, MYI first claims that it never "lost" the right to prosecute the 
Subject Claims in the first instance. See MYI Reply at p. 30. A necessary corollary of 
that argument is that Mr. Seely does not own the Subject Claims, is not a proper party, 
and was not properly joined pursuant to Rule 25(c). MYI has waived and/or should be 
estopped from making this argument. 
As is evidenced by the record below, it was MYI - and not ESI - who first 
proposed consideration and application of Rule 25(c). Below, ESI originally filed a Rule 
17(a) Objection, claiming MYI was not the real party in interest. In response, MYI 
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argued Rule 25(c) was the appropriate Rule for consideration because Rule 25(c) governs 
"[assignments of assets subsequent to the original filing of an action." (R. 3839-3846.) 
On May 21, 2007, the trial court found "MYI essentially concedes [a] transfer and 
assignment [of the Subject Claims] took place" and thereafter granted ESFs Motion for 
Substitution, finding Seely has "a clear personal interest in the subject matter of the 
action and in its outcome." (R. 2905-2906.) MYI never appealed the May 21, 2007 
ruling or sought reconsideration. Thereafter, on April 10, 2008, the trial court denied 
Clyde G. Seely's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim, finding Seely had 
"acquired all of the assets of MYI and its principals during the pendency of th[e] action 
by MYI." (R. 3991.) MYI did not appeal the trial court's April 10, 2008 Ruling, either. 
In November 2008, following ESI's Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice (which was 
filed based upon ESFs and Seely's stipulation to dismiss their respective claims against 
one another), MYI opposed the dismissal arguing ownership of the Subject Claims had 
not been adjudicated and, therefore, Seely lacked standing to stipulate to dismissal of the 
same. (R. 4124, 4126, 4129.) MYI claimed the trial court's prior rulings were simply an 
exercise of "judicial economy" to "insure that all parties who might have an interest in 
the litigation were before the [trial court]." (R. 4128.) MYI then requested that the trial 
court "reconsider" full and final adjudication of the ownership issue because it 
purportedly had "evidence" to present, id.; however, MYI did not articulate any of the 
factors contemplated by Rule 54(b) and required by Utah case law. (R. 4135 (citing 
U.R.C.P. 54(b) and Trembly v. Mrs. Field's Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310, n.2 (Utah 
App. 1994)). Thereafter, on January 21, 2009, the court granted ESI's Motion for 
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Dismissal with Prejudice. Therein, the trial court "restate[d] in greater detail its analysis 
of the "Settlement Agreement" because "MYI does not appear to understand that Ruling 
completely." (R. 4152.) 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See Pratt 
v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, % 15, 164 P.3d 366; see also Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249-50 
(Utah App. 1987) (wherein the Utah Court of Appeals applied collateral estoppel because 
appellant failed to fully raise her arguments before the trial court); see also Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, f 39, 86 P.3d 699 (appellate courts will review issues raised for 
the first time on appeal only if exceptional circumstances or plain error exists). In this 
case, the trial court found Rule 25(c) applicable and joined Mr. Seely (R. 2903-2909), 
ruled Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims (R. 3988-3992), and dismissed the Subject 
Claims, restating in "greater detail" its analysis in ruling Mr. Seely owned the Subject 
Claims (R. 4152-4156.). MYI has only appealed the trial court's final order, entered 
January 21, 2009 (R. 4152-4156), wherein the trial court dismissed the Subject Claims 
and simply restated in "greater detail" its prior analysis. 
Here, it was MYI - not ESI - who first raised the applicability of Rule 25(c). (R. 
3842-3845). Rule 25(c) is only applicable when a chose in action is transferred during 
the pendency of litigation. Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). MYI did not appeal that ruling; 
therefore MYI has waived its right to make, and should be estopped from making, any 
arguments (including the argument that it never "lost" the right to prosecute the Subject 
Claims) that would necessarily result in the analysis of an issue (whether Seely was a 
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properly joined party pursuant to Rule 25(c)) which was never properly preserved for 
appeal. MYI fails to point to exceptional circumstances or plain error, such that the 
appellate court may review this issue for the first time on appeal, and none exist. 
b. The District Court Did Not Rule that MYI's Continued Role 
as the Plaintiff After April 2004 was Proper Under Rule 
25(c). 
Contrary to MYI's repeated allegations, see e.g., MYI Reply at pp. 32-33, the 
district court in this case never ruled that MYI's continued role as the "plaintiff after 
April 2004 was proper under Rule 25(c). Rather, the trial court recognized that it would 
"not be prudent to substitute Mr. Seely in place of MYI" because of the counterclaims 
asserted by ESI against MYI. (R. 2906.) The trial court's recognition of MYI's potential 
liability on the affirmative claims against it (which are still pending), should not be read 
as an excuse or justification for MYI's conduct in taking inconsistent positions with 
respect to ownership of the Subject Claims and obstructing ESI in it efforts to resolve the 
issue by asserting improper legal arguments and false factual allegations. 
c. Rule 25(c) Is Not a "Substitute" for the Real Party in Interest 
Requirement and Does Not Permit the Unauthorized Pursuit 
of a Chose In Action. 
Finally, MYI's claim that an assignor can pursue a claim without authority is 
absolutely contrary to application of Rules 17 and 25. In RMA Ventures California v. 
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) the Tenth Circuit recently 
analyzed the interplay between Rule 17 and Rule 25 wherein the interest in the basis for 
the underlying litigation was transferred during the pendency of the action. In RMA, 
plaintiff RMA Ventures California originally filed suit against defendants Sun America 
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Life Insurance and Midland Loan Services for breach of contract and misrepresentation. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to implement a required interest rate reduction 
pursuant to the parties' mortgage agreement. The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, holding that plaintiffs voluntary interest payments over a 
four-year period precluded recovery on its claim. Plaintiff appealed the district court's 
decision. On appeal, defendants contended the appellate court should dismiss plaintiffs 
appeal for lack of standing. Specifically, defendants argued plaintiff no longer owned the 
legal rights to the cause of action because defendants purchased the rights at a public 
action sale. The Tenth Circuit recognized defendants' argument as the "proverbial 'curve 
ball'" which was further complicated by the fact that the execution sale was held to 
satisfy defendants' award of attorneys' fees - an award based solely on the grant of 
summary judgment which plaintiff attacked on appeal. 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiff did, in fact, lack standing to 
pursue its appeal. In so ruling the Court recognized a "well-founded prudential-standing 
limitation" is that litigants "cannot sue to enforce the right of others." Id. at 1073 (citing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)). A litigant's standing is contingent upon the entitlement to enforce 
an asserted right. Id. (citing Rawoofv. Texor Petrol. Co., Inc., 521 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 
2008)). The Tenth Circuit noted at the outset of the litigation, "Plaintiff was clearly the 
real party in interest." The question, however, the Tenth Circuit ruled had to be resolved 
is whether defendants obtained pPlaintiff s rights to the lawsuit, "thereby divesting 
Plaintiff of standing." Id. In concluding this was precisely what happened, the Tenth 
Circuit noted the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held "that a defendant can purchase 
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claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those 
claims." Id. at 1075 (citing Applied Medical Tech Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, f 13, 44 
P.3d 699, 701-02. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has likewise analyzed the interplay of Rules 17 
and 25 when choses in action are purchased during the pendency of the action. In 
Citizens National Bank v. Dixieland Forest Pros., LLC, 935 So.2d 1004 (2006), 
borrowers brought a lender-liability action against the bank, alleging the bank cancelled 
lines of credit without justification, and sought general damages and punitive damages. 
The bank counterclaimed, seeking payment on debts owed by the borrowers and a third 
party. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the bank's various motions for 
summary judgment. After an execution sale was held wherein the bank purchased the 
borrowers' chose in action, the trial court denied the bank's motion to substitute itself as 
plaintiff and have the lender-liability action dismissed. The bank appealed. On appeal, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In concluding that the trial court 
erred in not granting the bank's motion for substitution, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
reasoned: 
Although Rule 25(c) transfers are generally permissive, in this case, the 
execution sale and purchase of the lawsuits left only one party, the bank, 
with any interest in the litigation. Because Rule 17 allows only the real 
party in interest to prosecute its claims, the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing to substitute the bank as plaintiff in the 03-CV-030-B actions. 
Id, f 38, 935 So.2d at 1013. The court was unpersuaded by borrowers' inequity 
argument. 
While Rule 25(c) contemplates the continued pursuit of a chose in action by an 
28 
original plaintiff, the Rule does not provide the means for a party to continue to pursue, 
without authorization, a claim which it lost after the inception of the litigation. The 
Tenth Circuit and Mississippi Supreme Court case, both analyzing identical rules, are 
directly on point on this issue. It is the party who is the real party in interest, or its assign 
(if the assignment occurs during the course of litigation), who is permitted to prosecute a 
cause of action. MYI had no such authority from Seely and did not appeal either the trial 
court's May 21, 2007 order granting ESI's Motion for Substitution (R. 2903-2909) or the 
April 10, 2008 ruling wherein the trial court denied Mr. Seely's Motion to Dismiss and 
found Seely owned the Subject Claims (R. 3988-3992). 
3. There Was Not a Valid Purpose for MYFs Continued Role as 
Plaintiff After April 2004. 
Below, MYI contended that even without considering Rule 25(c), there was a 
"valid purpose and basis" for its continued role as Plaintiff after April 2004. (R. 4005-
4009.) Specifically, MYI asserted ownership of the Subject Claims is a legal issue and 
there was well more than "some" basis in law for MYI's continued prosecution of the 
Subject Claims. (R. 4006.) In this appeal, MYI asserts Rule 11 did not require it to 
"simply concede the alleged merits of ESI's claim" if there was a factual and legal basis 
to contest the claim. See MYI Reply at p. 40. Citing WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity 
Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139, MYI then argues that "Mr. Seely's 
understanding" and "Developers' understanding" that the subject claims had not been 
transferred provided a sufficient legal and factual justification for MYI to contest ESI's 
claim. Id. In addition, MYI asserts the language of the Settlement Agreement gave it 
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justification for such reliance. Finally, MYI argues ESI itself acknowledge that there was 
a basis for MYTs continued role as plaintiff after April 2004. These arguments are 
without merit. 
a. The Intent of Mr. Seely is Irrelevant Because the Settlement 
Agreement is Not Ambiguous. MYTs continued reliance on 
pre- Dairies cases is unwarranted by Utah law. 
As a preliminary matter, and as argued by ESI in opposition to MYTs appeal, the 
underlying Settlement Agreement in this case is not ambiguous and, therefore, the intent 
of Mr. Seely is irrelevant. See Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51 ffi[ 25, 31, 190 P.3d 1269 
(clarifying that the rule in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1995) justifies a finding of ambiguity only if the competing interpretations are reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract.) MYTs repeated citations to pre-Daines 
cases, including WebBank, are not controlling on contract interpretation. While Mr. 
Seely may not have "understood" he was specifically purchasing the Subject Claims, the 
Settlement Agreement plainly states that MYI retained no assets and Seely purchased 
everything not reserved to Developers. (R. 1676 at % H ("Seely's interest is in purchasing 
assets of Indemnitors owned by Developers or which are subject to the judgment, 
injunction, and garnishment") (emphasis added); R. 1677 at U 2(g) ("[A]s of the date of 
this Agreement, all of Indemnitors' assets and all interests therein (except those reserved 
to Developers), which have been or could be attached by Developers via the GIA or 
otherwise, are hereby conveyed to Developers and then to Seely" (emphasis added).) In 
the context of ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties, the Daines 
court clearly stated, "fBlefore permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a 
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determination of facial ambiguity." Dairies at f^ 25 (underline emphasis added). In 
discussing Ward, the Dairies court clarified that it never intended for a judge to allow 
surrounding circumstances to "create ambiguity" where the language of a contract would 
not otherwise permit. Id. at ^ 27. A correct application of the Ward rule to determine 
what the writing means still "begins and ends with the language of the contract." Id. at f 
30. Therefore, contrary to MYI's arguments, the "intentions" of Mr. Seely and 
Developers (the "alleged transferees") is not "controlling as a matter of law." A party 
cannot make a successful claim of ambiguity based on usage of a term that is not 
reasonable or is the product of "forced or strained construction." Id. at n. 5 (citing Saleh 
v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2006 UT 20, Tf 17, 133 P.3d 428). 
As noted by ESI in its response to MYI's appeal, MYI's efforts to create 
ambiguity are not credible or reasonably supported by the language of the contract. 
While MYI strenuously argues that the Court cannot ignore the plain "limiting language" 
defining "Indemnitors Assets," it casually (and without evidence) claims the use of the 
term "assets" in other areas of the Settlement Agreement should be characterized as 
"mistakenly not capitalized." Nothing in the ten (10) year history of this matter - or 
seven (7) year history of this litigation - has been identified or produced to support 
MYI's argument on this point. See MYI Reply at p. 11. MYI accuses ESI of "cobbling 
the Settlement Agreement" to reach its conclusion. However, the interpretation of ESI 
(and the district court) does not require a finding that certain terms were "mistakenly not 
capitalized," does not require looking outside the four comers at the belated "intent" of 
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the parties to interpret the Settlement Agreement, and does not require qualifying the 
testimony of the principals of MYI.11 
b. Even if Mr. Seely's "Intent" were Relevant, there is No 
Evidence In this Case that MYI had any Knowledge of Such 
Intent when it Continued Its Prosecution of the Subject 
Claims and Concealed/Confused Ownership of the Subject 
Claims. 
Moreover, with respect to Seely's intent, there is no evidence in this case (by 
affidavit or otherwise) that MYI had any knowledge of Seely's purported intent until he 
signed his affidavit on September 26, 2007. MYI argues that ESI had "confused the 
distinction between evidence and the record.55 See MYI Reply at p. 41. This statement 
fails to address the single fundamental issue at the core of this Rule 11 Motion - that is, 
MYTs concealment/confusion of the ownership issue and improper prosecution of the 
Subject Claims. MYI would have this Court accept the argument (without any 
supporting evidence) that MYI was aware of Seely's intent on or around the date of the 
Settlement Agreement and, therefore, it had a reasonable basis upon which to continue its 
prosecution of the Subject Claims. If that is true, why did Merrick Young testify he was 
no longer going to be in business in 2002 - following the initiation of the Developers5 
Litigation? SRF at f 1 8 , n.2. Why did Mr. Jensen attempt to withdraw as counsel in this 
11
 In its Reply Brief, MYI asserts, "ESI does not even attempt to argue, much less show, 
on appeal that MYI's arguments in support of its appeal of the Order of Dismissal have 
no legal or factual justification so as to constitute a farther Rule 11 violation." See MYI 
Reply at p. 41. ESI has adequately made its record in this case concerning which of 
MYI's arguments are without basis in law or fact in violation of Rule 11. ESI recognizes 
that MYI has a right to appeal the trial court's Order of Dismissal. The fact that ESI did 
not pursue Rule 11 sanctions in this appeal in no way impacts the validity of its 
arguments on the record below and herein and certainly does not "undercut55 ESI's 
claims. 
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litigation in March 2004 - following the execution of the Settlement Agreement? SRF at 
f 9. Why did Mr. Farley send a letter to counsel for ESI stating the Bond Company 
"owns the assets of [MYI], including all accounts receivable, etc."? SRF at f^ 13. Why 
did Alan Young testify MYI had no assets at the time of the September 2004 
reinstatement? SRF at fflf 16, 18. Why did Merrick Young testify that accounts 
receivable had been transferred to Seely? SRF at % 19.12 Why did MYI file the Motion 
for Protective Order and to Quash the Deposition of Clyde G. Seely relying on Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-1302(6) instead of for the reason that the Subject Claims were not 
transferred? (R. 3700-3706.) Why did MYI move to quash Mr. Seely's deposition at all? 
The deposition clearly would have given ESI the opportunity to discover what Mr. Seely 
knew and/or what his intentions were with respect to the Subject Claims. Why did MYI 
oppose joining Seely for the reason that Rule 25(c) allowed MYI to continue the 
prosecution of the claims instead of for the reason that the Subject Claims were not 
transferred? (R. 3839-3846; R. 3848-3857). The only way the history of this case can be 
reconciled is to conclude MYI (and Mr. Jensen and Mr. Farley) believed the Subject 
Claims had been lost—transferred and sold—and MYI's present counsel is now simply 
looking for a way to justify its prior conduct. 
MYI attempts to qualify this testimony by pointing to Merrick's statement that the 
accounts receivable had been transferred "in some form" does not change the impact of 
the testimony. There is no dispute in this case that the Subject Claims are based upon 
monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to the Subcontract (the alleged ESI account 
receivable). SRF at 3. Therefore, regardless of the "form" in which they were 
transferred, Merrick admitted the transfer of the basis of the Subject Claims to Seely 
"personally." SRF 19. 
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c. There is No Evidence in the Record of Developers' Intent -
MYTs Reference to Such Misrepresents the Testimony of 
Clark Fetzer. 
MYTs reliance upon Developer's purported intent is also without merit. See e.g., 
MYI Reply at pp. 19, ^ 3; pp. 27-28, 33-34. First, as noted at § II.B.3.a., supra, the intent 
of Developers is irrelevant. Dairies, supra, at ^ 25 ("[B]efore permitting recourse to parol 
evidence, a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity.") Moreover, MYI has 
misrepresented the evidence in the record. 
Even a cursory review of the affidavit of Clark Fetzer, which was filed in support 
of ESTs Rule 17(a) Objection/Rule 25 Motion (R. 1431-1433), clearly shows it provides 
no "evidence" regarding the intent of Developers regarding the acquisition or transfer of 
assets. Rather, the affidavit simply establishes that in September 2005, months after the 
Settlement Agreement was executed, Developers did not believe it then owned the 
Subject Claims and did not hire Mr. Farley to prosecute the action on behalf of 
Developers. (R. 1432 at f^ 4-5.) MYTs claim that Mr. Fetzer's testimony in this regard 
evidences the "intent" of Developers with respect to the acquisition and transfer of claims 
is completely without merit and should be disregarded. 
d. ESI did Not Acknowledge MYI to be a Proper "Plaintiff 
After April 2004. 
Finally, MYI incorrectly contends that ESI itself acknowledged that there was a 
basis for MYTs continued role as plaintiff after April 2004 because "ESI's February 
2007 motion for substitution did not claim MYTs continued role as plaintiff was 
wrongful." See MYI Reply at p. 24, \ 3; see also id. at p. 33. This statement absolutely 
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misrepresent -:<• •. . —* ' • Fh st ii 1 the Febr i lai y 200 7 pleading referenced !:>; r "h 1 ) " I 
in its Reph rlriei", ESI specifically argued, "[U]nlike the situation in Tisch [Federal 
Deposit i.t* --n v 7 , -. i \ R i) :|46, 32 F ed. R Ser \ 2d 116 7 (E.D.N Y. 1981)], it 
appears (lull Ml i1 I  In.i iKiiil r d i i i t i n f J I I i i i l u r c s t ill l l i r n l i m n s , . m i l • ,i ml i s i i p | > M i , » " » , i i ,l1 
Mr. Seely be substituted for MYI rather than mere I \ joined as a party "n • k.
 A4&±., 
Ultimately, ESI pled that Mr, Seely be joined to avoid a multiplicity of suits. \ K *<i£.:\ 
II w\v\v\, l;M ii in MM iH.l I..1 ,4>ci"if ii. mil, .is'.iiliiig llidl l\I i I , continued prosecution of 
the Subject Claims is wrongful See e.g., R. 3019-3020; see also R. 3025 at \ -: " 
present claim to the contrary is completely without merit. 
Ne vei theless, ai id as argued be lo \ i , "h 1 Y I dc €is have a proper place *c 
litigation. Specifically, it must answer to the affirmative clain • ^ !* 
(and which are still pending) against if, (R, W20-3G22.) -Ki^over, even ij Mil's 
present misrepresentation ww true, i Si s oUu„r n»es not excuse MYI's conduct in 
this iiKiflet* . . • ' • » * .• an :l othe i: le gal conte ntioi is 
that were :n- >'uranted h\ existing law ;;K; .lsscited allegations and other factual 
contentions that lacked c\ • uu^ary support. Nor does the fact that ESI was required to 
*'i|" »iaims serk»p> dn"h?,ff<«\ fvlji I \ iniln nn<"i«li|(i l ill c kiih|H"i < "I i»11 r < MMFC 
MYI's improper conduct between 2004 and 2007. As noted in its Opening Brief, ESFs 
Second Amended Complaint was not filed until late 2007. Id. at.p 40 Therefore, 
was required to raise the ownership issue of "the Sub ject Claims because of the 1 arioi is 
inconsistent positions taken by MYI with respect to ownership. Id. (citing SRF at f 28). 
ESI has never acknowledged MYI to be a "proper plaintiff after it lost the Subject 
Claims to Developers. MYI's assertions are simply yet another example of MYI's 
revision of the evidence and underlying pleadings. 
C. MYFs Argument that ESFs Rule 11 Motion Failed as a Matter of Law 
Because of the Remedy Sought Is Unsupported by Utah Law. 
As a "new issue" on appeal, MYI asserts ESI's Rule 11 Motion failed as a matter 
of law because it was filed for the improper purpose of obtaining a final disposition of the 
subject claims. See MYI Reply at p. 35-39. MYI apparently claims its misstatements 
were not significant, see id. at p. 35, and further claims "Rule 11 does not allow for the 
'ultimate' sanction of dismissal of a pleading that was not filed in violation of Rule 11." 
Id. at pp. 27, 37. Finally, though not entirely clear, MYI appears to argue that Rule 11 
sanctions cannot be awarded based upon the merits of a party's claim. Id. at p. 3613 For 
the reasons set forth herein, MYI's arguments are without merit and should be summarily 
rejected. 
As a preliminary matter, MYI's present argument that its "misstatements" were 
not significant and/or that its counsel's failure in 2004 to conduct a reasonable inquiry 
regarding ownership of the Subject Claims is excusable are completely without merit and 
have been well rebutted herein. Facts and arguments set forth by ESI in this appeal, and 
below, are incorporated herein by reference. 
13
 MYI further asserts that ESI did not file its Rule 11 Motion to remedy any alleged 
harm or prejudice to it. See MYI Reply at p. 36. This is absolutely without merit. As 
noted in its Opening Brief, both below and on appeal ESI demonstrated the great 
significance the ownership issue had in the Action. See ESI Opening Br. at p. 44-48. 
Those arguments will not be repeated here but are incorporated herein by reference. 
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MYI's argument that Rule _ „o^o not "allow" for the ultimah1 saiuhuii i>l 
dismissal ol a pleading is likewise without merit. Not surprisingly, MYI cites no 
authority tm IK pM»p<>s»i»'»n Knlr \\\i | pip\ nk <• i^r '"'iiiipos|itioii of] an appropriate 
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties." u .R . l . r . i >mk • • >. 
continues, 
A sanction imposed for violation of this rule may consist of, or include, 
directives of a non-monetary nature, an order io pay a penalty into court, or, 
if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order 
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney 
fees and other expenses incurred .-.< a direct result of the violation. 
iMiiJi  I li i HI ' i lempiuisis ui^uu .... . es trial courts great leeway to tailor the 
sanction to fit the requirements * untain 
TTr
 ' and Sewer, 2009 UT App 18x * " : I i._d 120 (uiim '. Oc R Energies v. 
Mulhur barth indiL\ , ittt , •;!(» I\z<l iliort, luXO (Utah 1907)) 'I In- rule provides trial 
courts with a list ol" pminhmrnh hoi • " Iin L ippiupnaU "Nam, huii m ^ be tailored. 
Id (citing U.R.C.P. 11(e)(2)). Appellate courts afford trial courts uunsiu- - i 
discretion lu deteiiiiiiit what sanction will be mos.! effettiie In tld. ndesirable 
condui' II >" I i,,' i ' i W , ' / i i (hUvtku, "IH'M ' ' '" ' || I' U »>MI AndKaiserman 
Assocs.t Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 19W)) 
To the extent!•- , suggests that Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate 5n thi • vase 
because they M •: a pi • ^aii . ,. * rf*c<*pt 
ruling in Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, supra wlinvin llii < nil 
affirmed a trial court's Rule 11 sanction of both dismissal ot the complaint without 
prc|i '• . nation 10 Utah Dept ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892P.2d4 
(1995) is inapposite to the issues before this court as it addresses a discovery sanction -
not a Rule 11 sanction. 
MYI cites absolutely no legal authority to support its argument that ESFs Rule 11 
Motion failed as a matter of law because of the sanction sought. MYI lost its right to 
pursue the claims either in 2004, when the Subject Claims were lost to Developers and 
sold to Seely, or in 2007, when the trial court joined Seely as the plaintiff because of his 
"clear personal interest in the subject matter of the action and in its outcome." (R. 2906.) 
MYI pursued the claims without the authority of Seely and continued to pursue the 
claims after the court joined Seely on May 15, 2007, which, as noted supra, is not 
permitted by Rule 25(c). Requesting dismissal of a complaint as an appropriate sanction 
against a party who is not the real party in interest (and who had no authority to continue 
its prosecution of the claims) is certainly contemplated within Rule 11 which allows a 
court to enter a sanction, as appropriate, to "deter repetition" of such improper conduct. 
D. MYFs Argument that ESI Failed to Offer Evidence Showing a Rule 11 
Violation Under Morse is Without Merit. 
In section IV of its Reply, MYI generally argues that ESI failed to offer any 
evidence showing a Rule 11 violation as required by Morse v. Packer, supra, 2000 UT 
86. See MYI Reply at pp. 42-43. MYI claims ESI failed to show that the order denying 
ESFs Rule 11 Motion was erroneous because: 
ESI cites no evidence that (1) conclusively established, independent from 
the allegedly false litigation statements or positions, that MYI, in fact, had 
transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely under the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement, or (2) that conclusively established that MYI or its 
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counsel knew reasonably should have known, in 
I after, of such independent evidence. 
h : :-,cply at n argument in this regard is not entirely clear Aid is not 
supporteu i). .1 ii-isniMim u.iuirp1 lit IfthfM1 Ncnihck'ss, i c\inn tl less ml1 ulielltet (he 
Subject Claims were transferred, MYTs Rule
 AA violation is based upon statements niul 
arguments made which were unsupported b\ faeK and'or legal authority. See e.g., 
< ' " i. - arguments below were wrong 
but that those arguments were not supported by ai i) legal an ithorit) especiallj gi »/ e 1:1 t l ie 
fact that [counsel] had anticipated the res judicata issue before filing this suit"). 
Jence estaoiistnng " and'or its counsel's 
violations of Rule 11 have uccn clear H < a i\^v .-, * . rnthJaled in 
fiill There is absolutely no evidence that, despite being put on notice the Bond Company 
i TVtampers) controlled and essentially owned MYI, inch iding all of its accounts 
receivable Mi l ;arle\ iiiadi* n r a s o n a M r I I I M ' S I I I M I I M I I iiiiiil illllli n u i u s l n p ul l lu: ' M I I > | U I 
Claims before pursuing the litigation in thij ^^, Thereafter MYI and/or its counsel 
confused and concealed the issue of ownership of the Subject Claims and used the April 
2004 I d i n J i l l i i h i it iepresentaliiiii'i na mhui i, piuiliiLhuii In prevent LSI liuirt 
conducting its own discovery on the issue. Finally, as has been described herein, MYI 
and/or it counsel asserted legal arguments that had no basis in law or fact all of which 
Kill was iTi|iiii'nli ( i dr l rml 
j y 
Contrary to MYI's claim, ESI has marshaled sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that MYI and/or its counsel violated Rule 11 and that the trial court's Order 
denying such Motion was erroneous. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT AWARDING 
SANCTIONS AGAINST MYI AND ITS COUNSEL. 
The final issue raised by ESI below is whether the trial court abused its discretion 
by not awarding sanctions against MYI and its counsel. In its Reply, MYI does not 
appear to specifically respond to this issue except to state the abuse of discretion standard 
is not "applicable here because the court did not impose any Rule 11 sanctions, having 
determined there was no Rule 11 violation." See MYI Reply at p. 20, n. 4. MYI cites 
Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, \ 6, 197 P.3d 650, in support of its argument. ESI 
respectfully disagrees that Archuleta supports MYI's argument. Paragraph 6 of the 
Archuleta opinion sets forth the standard of review in Rule 11 cases and specifically 
states, "The trial court's determination regarding the type and amount of sanctions to be 
imposed is reviewed for abuse of discretion" Archuleta v. Galetka, supra at f 6 (citing 
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, If 10, 985 P.2d 255). In fact, in Gillmor v. Family Link 
supra (a case cited by MYI in its Reply Brief; see MYI Reply Br. at p. 30), this 
Honorable Court recently reviewed the denial of a Rule 11 Motion and request to impose 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1). In upholding the lower court's denial, the Gillmor 
court could not say that the district court's findings were against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, it would not "disturb the district court's decision not to impose 
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sanctions against Mrs. Gillmor and Mr. Baird for violating rule lUhV »/ 
supra, at ^  20. 
Belo v\ ai id on appeal, ESI demonstrated the great significance the ownership issue 
had in tin* Ai lion M \ I <ltn', IH.I i Nil ,in\ o f F S P i itifjuitiaih: iii lLi,< H^MIH Ibl m liiiiii 
that they are mere speculation and are merely a "variation of [ESI 's] ineffective argument 
that it should not have had to defend against the Subject Claims," See MYI Reply at p. 
H ii "i I'M irspivfliill", I hiiifiri 111,ill Hit pi't fiiiiiiu i i n i n r mil IIIMII \\A\ \\\V lu HI Inn! 
against the "meri ts" of the Subject Claims but against a party who lacked the authority 
to prosecute or, alternatively, who concealed or confused the identity of the owner to 
? In 
its Reply. See M Y I Reply Br ai pp. 25-26, ^ 5. Had M Y I argued in January 2007 th; ii 
the Subject Claims were not lost to Developers because they had been "excepted" from 
lib" Silikiiiciil Agreement, ESI could have sought a n iling on the ternib oi the Settlement 
Agreement at that t ime. Instead, a$ wa * \ ;- * n, 
MYI set forth numerous factual and legal contentions which were unsupported by fact or 
jyjYj i i a s n o t effectively rebutted RSI 's iiii'p.iiiiiciil Ii il ll i I il n I ,ili -.i H H < 
discretion by not awarding sanctions against MYI and its counsel The arguments made 
: \ neiow and on this 'appeal, see EM upciuiig tir. at pp. 44 -48, are incorporated 
herein as i t, set for th in full. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it denied ESI's Rule 11 Motion. Contrary to MYTs 
contention, there is no "exception" to the requirement that a trial court must describe the 
conduct constituting a basis for its denial. Moreover, the trial court's finding of 
"insufficient evidence" was clearly erroneous as it is unsupported by the record. MYI 
incorrectly assumes ESI's Rule 11 Motion is based solely upon the loss of the Subject 
Claims by MYI and the subsequent transfer of the claims to Mr. Seely. See e.g., MYI 
Reply at p. 18, see also id. at pp. 22-23, ^ 2. However, as is evidenced herein, the basis 
of ESI's Rule 11 Motion is MYTs conduct between 2004 and 2007. As noted herein and 
below, during that period of time, MYI deliberately and intentionally concealed and 
confused the issue regarding ownership of the claims. Even if there was a legitimate 
question regarding ownership of the Subject Claims, MYI asserted arguments, which ESI 
was required to defend, that lacked any basis in law or fact. Just one example of this 
violation is MYI's claim in January 2007 that it was authorized pursuant to Utah's 
winding up statute to prosecute the subject claims, when at the time MYI made this 
argument it was not a dissolved corporation! As noted by MYI in its Reply Brief, "[a] 11 
of MYI's litigation responses" were made to, inter alia, prevent Mr. Seely from being 
"dragged into the lawsuit." See MYI Reply at p. 50. Unfortunately, MYI and its counsel 
ran afoul of Rule 11 when their efforts included concealing and confusing the issue of 
ownership and making claims unsupported by facts and arguments unsupported by law. 
Despite MYI's claims to the contrary, whether the Subject Claims were ever 
transferred does not matter in determining that MYI violated Rule 11 in this case. As is 
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amply set forth herein, MYI made a number of factual and It ral t'onlaitioii', nml dnii.ils 
in its pleadings which support both a finding of a T<\--W i 1 violation and an imposition of 
nfusing the Issue regarding ownership of the Subject 
Claims and making contentions and arguiriniK \\\\u In VM-IH iiii ,up|M»rird b>. iati n i,n\ 
MYI and its counsel hindered the process of adjudication and made the task of the 
iiiitlcilying court more ditncu .. •. durt -vH~u - i s admittedly to avoid having Mr. 
Seely "dragged int< . . / . . - massing and 
caused unnecessary uel-i\ a id needless increase in the cost of litigation \m , ist !\ 
11 li type of conduct sanctionable under Rule 11 ^ ^ 11 should be enforced in this case 
and sanctions SIKMIIII In i i "tnled a^n •' ' counsel -.. • the 
alternative, the case should be remanded for the entry of findini? ,s. 
I) VIED this 2Uday of May, 2010. 
k iM'h , \ r • . K MMs i:\Sl N & BOOTH, P C. 
Clark R Fetzer O 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
:th I hereby certify that on this 25 day of May, 2010,1 sent two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT to each of the 
parties below: 
E. Scott Savage (#2865) 
Stephen R. Waldron (#6810) 
SAVAGE, YEATES, & WALDRON, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
and 
Jon Lear 
LEAR & LEAR 
The Downey Mansion 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84012 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Lisa Hilden 
Legal Assistant 
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Addendum 
ADDENDUM 
\ copy of the trial court's decision in Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App. 
- on ^?4P.3d741 
1 
Tabl 
H I M DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ' n i r d Judicial District 
SUMMi 
NADINE GILLMOR, 
Plaintiff, 
By. 
M ~ 1 2008 
SUMMIT COUNT* 
tup 
"VSpufy-eiark 
RUT .INC AND ORDER 
FAMILY IJVK. LLC, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, DAVID K. RICHARDS, 
an individual, BARRY TODD MILLER, an 
individual, JOAN ELLEN MILLER, an 
individual, DOUG CARL DOHRING, as 
an individual and as Trustee, LAURIE 
ANN DOHRING, an individual, KENNETH 
W. MACEY, an individual, ROBIN A. 
MACEY, an individual, and JOHN DOES 
1-40, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 070500385 
Judge R o u e n rv. Hiiuer 
Aii defendants in this action except barry iodu Mil! ,:.,V...i ,;!1-.: \ ! 
requested Rule ' 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions against plaintiff Nadine Gillmor and 
hrr Miliums, "••"•" H ll.niil I irOnd nils F.imily hnl> mil lln Mai'cys (hrrniKiflcr "M.ucyi 1 
and defendant ;.;.md K. Richards (hereinafter "Richards") filed the initial Motion jointly, and 
counsel foi tlicsi' df ffiidmils h.'ivc taken I lie I ihonny o,n in In h-Hpo unl wujnv lhi.J M'>i << >M. 
Defendants Doug Dohring and Laurie Dohring (hereinafter "Dohrings") subsequently joined in 
the otlit-r (li^ feiiilint1-' Motion hiil I toluiir' , .ii,i IMI .ulii ,\<\\ lndepenoYnl analysis hi • ' 1 
also note that counsel for Maceys and Richards are the same counsel who represented these 
1 
parties in.the prior 2001 litigation (Nadine Gillmor v. Family Link, et al, Summit County Civil 
• 'No. 010600155) that played a critical pa i t ii 1111; r dismissal c f this ease on defendants' "ts lotion , 
and that now plays an important part in determination of the present Rule 11 Motion. I also note 
t l < . - • • < • m 
The Motion was argued to me on April 4, 2008, and should have been decided before this 
.'.date. I apologize to ecu ii isel and par ties foi the delay , but as I explained at the close of argumei it, I 
can think of few more difficult decisions than one that raises the spectre of sanctions against a 
'respected and able member of tl: le Bai , and I have taken perhaps excessive care in researching and 
deciding this matter tor that reason. 
B A C ri 0 1 II I D ; •• .. •,;• 
ihe present Motion for Rule 11 sanctions arises from plaintiffs Complaint in this action, 
which asserts two Causes of Action. The first is styled "Condemnation," and the second 
"Declaration of Highway by Use/ The Complaint was filed July 12, 2007. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the claims, and plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Following 
argument on December .19, 2007,1 dismissed both claims on the basis of res judicata (the 2001 
action), and denied plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I denied defendants' 
Motion to -;] iss on me alternative grounds oi judicial estoppel, and oecause I decided the 
Motion based on res judicata, I expressly did not reach defendants' separate claims that the Cause 
or Act .. ;...(•,, .ndemnation should be dismissed because (I) plaintiff has no authority to condemn 
defendants' property, or (2) the proposed condemnation is not for a public use. (See Order 
enteret I Febn lai y 20. 2008). ::•;,; ::;;:V;| :\-r-::'.. :' ;-•'';..• : • , : •• . '•' .-.-.; ; 
I will not recite the history of this case It is well-summarized in the briefing, and for more 
details reference should be made to my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 23, 
2002, and the Judgment dated and entered September 24, 2002, in the prior action, and the 
subsequent Court of Appeals opinion found at 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57 (Ut.Ct.App. 2005). 
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF RULE 11 
Although defendants' original Motion at least referenced Rule 11(b)(2) (non-frivolous 
basis in law) and (3) (factual claims must have evidentiary support) (Memorandum in Support 
dated August 6, 2007, p. 6), as the briefing evolved (and after the court granted the Motion to 
Dismiss), the focus shifted to Rule 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) and (2) (non-frivolous basis in 
law). (Reply Memorandum dated March 5, 2008). Defendants identify factual problems 
contained in plaintiffs arguments opposing the sanctions Motion, but they do not specifically 
argue that the facts alleged in the Complaint initiating this action lack evidentiary support or "are 
[not] likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery." (Rule 11(b)(3)). 
After considering all of the filings in this case, I cannot say that the facts underlying the 
nineteen specific allegations in the Complaint are not likely to have evidentiaiy support (which is 
not the same as saying those facts would be persuasive, but that is not the standard), particularly in 
light of the more than 100 years of history upon which plaintiff appears to rely. The one 
allegation that skates closest to the line is No. 1: "Gillmor's property is essentially landlocked." 
That allegation appears inconsistent with my Findings of Fact in the prior action, but the word 
"essentially" at least opens the door to a determination through investigation and discovery that 
the alternate routes are so impractical, at least for the purposes desired, that the land may be 
"essentially" landlocked. Defendants also note that the defendants are not all of the surrounding 
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landowners, but that suggestion appears only in a memorandum, and not in the Complaint. At 
paragraphs 16 and 17 plaintiff makes the relevant allegations; namely, that defendants own the 
land between plaintiffs property and the Weber Canyon Road, and that the Perdue Creek and Neil 
Creek roads run across defendants' properties. These are probably accurate statements. 
For the foregoing reasons, I will not analyze the Rule 11 Motion under sub-sections (b)(3) 
or (4), but will limit analysis to sub-sections (b)(1) and (2). With this in mind, I note that any 
monetary sanctions under subsection (b)(2) may only be imposed on counsel, Mr. Baird, but that 
if I find a violation of subsection (b)(1), sanctions (monetary or other) may be assessed against 
either or both Ms. Gillmor and Mr. Baird. (Rule 11(c)(2)(A), U.R.C.P.) 
IMPROPER PURPOSE, RULE 11(b)(1) 
The Rule states that an action may "not [be] presented for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Rule 
ii(bxi). 
The defendants bear the burden of showing the improper purpose. The recent case law 
(since at least 1998 with the Pennington case, through 2005 with Mt. Vida) creates some 
confusion, at least in my mind, whether a Rule 11(b)(1) claim requires a showing of subjective 
bad faith. There is no question, either now or in 1998, that under the previously codified § 78-27-
56 (now § 78B-5-825), an action must be without merit, and brought in bad faith (or an absence of 
good faith) and the standard is subjective good or bad faith. See, Pennington v. Allstate. 973 P.2d 
932, 938, n.3 (Utah 1998), Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983), and Still Standing 
Stable. LLC, v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005). 
Plaintiff argues that the standard is the same under both § 78-27-56 and Rule 11(b)(1). 
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Defendants argue that it is not. Both have support. In Pennington, the court stated that: "[R]ule 
11 sanctions do not require a party to act with a lack of good faith." 973 P.3d at 938, n.3. In Mt. 
Vida Enterprises v. Stem. 2005 UT App. 400, 122 P.3d 144 (Ut.Ct.App. 2005), the Court of 
Appeals stated that: "[B]oth of these theories [Rule 11 and abuse of process], like Utah Code 
section 78-27-56(1), would require a showing of bad faith or its equivalent." Id. at 149, n.6. 
I cannot readily reconcile the two cases, except to note that one is the Utah Supreme court, 
and it should control, but perhaps the difference is not material in this case. That is, all cases that 
address the improper purpose standard under either Rule 11(b)(1) or the statute appear to treat the 
issue as one of fact, see, e.g. Pennington, 973 P.2d at 936, which implies an evidentiary hearing 
(either the underlying trial or a specific hearing on the fee motion), and I have never awarded § 
78-27-56 fees without such a hearing.1 
The language of Rule 11(b)(1) (set forth above) suggests at least some overlap between the 
standards of the Rule, and § 78-27-56. That is, Utah courts have defined the statutoiy standard 
with some specificity: To show a lack of good faith, or the existence of bad faith, for purposes of 
§ 78-27-56, it must be shown that one of the following three factors is lacking: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others. 
Still Standing Stable, 122 P.3d at 560 (quoting In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, % 48, 86 P.3d 712 
(Utah 2004). 
1
 Under § 78-27-56, the necessary bad faith inquiry is identified in Cady v. Johnson; 671 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1983) and subsequent cases. It is not a simple standard, it. is factual, and parties have been 
warned by the Utah Supreme Court to avoid conflating the two requirements of lack of merit and bad 
faith into one. See Still Standing Stable. LLC, v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005). 
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Whether the standard is subjective bad faith, as identified above, or objective improper 
purpose, the record in this case does not provide a sufficient basis to attribute either such motive 
to plaintiff or Mr. Baird. In the present case, I see no evidence of a purpose to harass, delay or 
impose unnecessary cost. The purpose is clear-to obtain access that has not been obtained 
through previously advanced theories. Neither can I find sufficient evidence in the record to show 
the absence of an honest belief that the action might be justified, or that the action was filed to 
take unconscionable advantage of defendants. There is no question that the action (the present 
and prior actions, in fact) have cost defendants very large sums, but I cannot conclude that there 
was ever, now or in the past, a purpose to needlessly increase the costs of litigation. 
Finally, I note that defendants point to statements of what actions may be brought in the 
future, by other parties who may or may not be represented by Mr. Baird, but until such actions 
are filed there is no way for this court to assess the merits of such actions, and I do not see how 
the threat of such actions shows the improper purpose required by the Rule. Excessive zeal in a 
cause is not necessarily an improper puipose or evidence of bad faith, and I hereby DENY the 
sanctions Motion based on Rule 11(b)(1), U.R.C.P. What may require sanctions, however, is an 
action prompted by such zeal, but which cannot be legally justified by this plaintiff against these 
defendants, and that is the next inquiry. 
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW, RULE 11(b)(2) 
I start this section by clarifying that I am not now addressing whether the two claims 
advanced by plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, have any basis in law, or a in a reasonable extension of 
existing law. For the sake of argument (but only for that purpose) I will concede that one or both 
theories, highway by use or private condemnation, may be viable. The sole inquiry in the context 
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of this case, with its inextricable ties to the prior action (and, indeed, to the settlement of the 1984 
action that is referenced throughout the record), is whether Nadine Gillmor had a basis in law, or 
in a reasonable extension of existing law, to bring a new action seeking increased access to her 
property over and across the defendants' properties. Stated a little differently, is there an 
objectively reasonable basis in law justifying this new approach to Ms. Gillmor's apparently 
intractable problem of how to obtain access to her property that meets her needs and desires? 
I will start by sketching the law of res judicata: 
The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously 
litigated issues from being relitigated. Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Generally, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a 
claim that has been fully litigated previously. In order for a claim to be precluded under 
this doctrine the party seeking preclusion must establish three elements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second the claim 
that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that 
could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 2003 UT 13, f 34, 73 P.3d 325, 332 (Utah 2003) (all internal 
citations omitted; emphasis added). 
I will not define issue preclusion, because that doctrine is not the specific bar to plaintiffs 
present action. Addressing the three elements of claim preclusion: (1) This action involves the 
same parties and/or privies as the prior action. (2) The claim for access over the properties was 
the heart of the prior action. It is plaintiffs argument that (a) the present legal theories supporting 
access were not presented in the prior action, which they were not, and (b) there was no need to 
argue the present theories until this court and the Utah Court of Appeals ruled against plaintiffs 
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claims which were advanced througli different theories. Both arguments fail, because the present 
arguments were always available (and according to plaintiff they have been legally and factually 
available for many decades), and the claims or theories could and should have been presented in 
the first case, either as alternative theories, or as the theories that best fit the facts alleged. (3) 
There is no question that the prior action was fully adjudicated, at trial, on appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and through denial of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The foregoing is a brief statement of this court's reason for dismissing the present action, 
and I am at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the present action without 
violating Rule 11(b)(2), U.R.C.P. That is, once the three elements are satisfied, I am unaware of 
any exceptions to application of the bar imposed by res judicata, and plaintiff has not identified 
any such exception. She argues, as already noted, that her present "legal causes of action . . . were 
utterly unnecessary" until the Court of Appeals ruled against her, but that argument only suggests 
that litigation choices were made, as they should be, and not every possible theory was advanced. 
Nevertheless, the claim for access was aggressively pursued, and resolved. Res judicata has 
several purposes, one of which is "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits." 
Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P. 845 P.2D 944, 946 (Ut.Ct.App. 1992). 
If an appellate court disagrees with my application of the doctrine of res judicata to the 
present action, then any determination of a violation of Rule 11(b)(2), and imposition of 
sanctions, will be similarly flawed, but unless and until that happens, I am constrained to follow 
the logic of the underlying dismissal, and my analysis of Rule 11(b)(2), to find that the present 
action was filed in contravention of the Rule. I note the particular force of Schoneyv. Memorial 
Estates, Inc. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993), in support of this conclusion. 
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To summarize, I do not disagree that Mr. Baird's research of underlying theories may not, 
in fact, be flawed/?er se. Indeed, one or both theories may support his conclusion that some 
plaintiff, some day, may have an argument for a highway by use or private condemnation claim. I 
do not reach that issue. The flaw in the filing is that this plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, may not now 
bring such a claim, because of the prior fully litigated claims between these parties or their 
privies. The res judicata bar is clear, it is ancient, and it applies conclusively in this case. Ms. 
Gillmor has had her day in court on the claims presented in this action, albeit presented now in a 
new form. 
SANCTIONS 
Because the only Rule violated in this case is Rule 11(b)(2), a monetary sanction may not 
be imposed against Ms. Gillmor. Monetary sanctions may be imposed against Mr. Baird, counsel 
for plaintiff, and other sanctions may be imposed against either or both Mr. Baird and Ms. 
Gillmor. The Rule specifically provides that: "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated." (Rule 11(c)(2)) Sanctions may include "an order directing payment of 
some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
violation." Id. 
Defendants have all sought payment of attorney's fees, and the affidavits to date support 
very substantial amounts incurred, all related to the filing of this action and defendants' successful 
motions to dismiss. The courts have, however, given guidance on the meaning of the sanctions 
language, and the purpose of sanctions, which guidance persuades me that an award of all fees and 
costs is not mandated by the Rule, and this court should exercise its sound discretion in 
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determining the appropriate sanction. See, e.g. Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1998), and Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993). Specifically, "a 
violation of Rule 11(b) does not mandate the sanction of attorney fees." Crank v. The Utah 
Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, 20 P.3d 307, 316 (Utah 2001). 
Federal cases give further direction. Some of the guiding principles include the following: 
"The purpose of sanctions under Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings and streamline the 
administration of justice. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Sanctions 
should therefore be educational and rehabilitative in character and, as such, tailored to the 
particular wrong. Topalian v. Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931, 936-37 (5th Cir. 1993)." Jordaan v. Hall. 275 
F.Supp.2d 778, 790-91 (N.D.Tex. 2003). Finally, "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute in the 
sense that the loser pays. It is a law imposing sanctions if counsel files with improper motives or 
inadequate investigation." Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.. 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 
1989) (en banc). 
In this case, plaintiff did not obtain the property access she sought in the 2001 action, 
which in turn interpreted the settlement agreement arising from a 1984 action. In this action, new 
and experienced counsel advanced theories not asserted in the prior action, but which could have 
been, in an attempt to gain rights of access probably even greater than argued for in the 2001 
action, or bargained for in prior agreements. I have found that the action is not legally justified, at 
least not an action brought by Nadine Gillmor to expand her access rights across the land owned 
by defendants. Nothing in the proceedings in this action persuades me that Ms, Gillmor will seek 
personally to advance such an action in her name, but it is patently clear that she may seek to 
create certain rights to access through others. I do not see how sanctions seeking to deter Ms. 
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Gillmor or Mr. Baird from such an effort are justified by Rule 11 if the action is otherwise 
justified, but a sanction should be imposed in this case, pursuant to the Rule, to deter others 
generally from bringing claims barred by either claim preclusion or issue preclusion, when all the 
elements are present. 
I determine that Mr. Baird, counsel for plaintiff, shall pay $5,000 each to the Macey and 
Richards defendants, and $2,500 to the Dohring defendants, for a total of $12,500.00. As an 
additional sanction, Nadine Gillmor is hereby enjoined from filing any further action seeking 
access to her property, or modification of the access she presently enjoys, across any of the 
defendants* properties unless she first seeks leave of court to file such an action, with notice to all 
intended defendants. In any request for such leave, Ms. Gillmor is ordered to reveal the full 
history of agreements and litigation, including the 2001 action, this action, and the sanctions 
imposed herein. 
No further Order is required, but defendants' counsel shall prepare appropriate Judgments 
based on this Order, which judgments will provide for post-judgment interest at the 2008 rate 
from the date of this Order. The court, however, further Orders that any execution of judgments 
shall be stayed until the appeal time from this Order and the underlying dismissal Order has 
expired. If a timely appeal is filed, then plaintiff shall have ten business days to seek a further stay 
on appeal, and the parties may address the issue of any appropriate bond at that time. 
DATED this 30th day of June, 2008. 
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